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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
AUTOMOBILES-WHo ARE PASSENGERS, GUESTS, LICENSEES-WHETHER GUEST
STATUTE IS

AvAILABLE

AS A DEFENSE TO ACTION BY INFANT UNDER SEVEN FOR

INJURIES SUFFERED WHILE A PAsSENGER.-An infant under seven is incapable

mentally of accepting an invitation to ride in an automobile and cannot be

a guest as a matter of law within the meaning of the Indiana motor vehicle guest statute in force in 1936,1 according to a recent decision of the
2
Indiana Appellate Court.
The plaintiff, a six year old girl, was left for a two-hour period in
the custody of the defendant with instructions to put her to bed. She
however induced the defendant to take her for an automobile ride, during which she suffered severe injuries in a collision. After trial and
judgment against him, the defendant appealed from the court's refusal
to grant a new trial and assigned as error the submission to the jury of
1 "No person who is transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle,
as his guest, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action
for damages against such owner or operator, for injury, death or loss, in case of
accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such
owner or operator or caused by his reckless disregard of the rights of others."
Ch. 201, § 1, Acts of Indiana General Assembly, 1929. (For act now in force, see
47-1021 Burns Indiana Stats. Ann., 1933.)
2

Fuller v. Thrun, 31 N. E. (2d) 670 (Ind. App., 1941).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

the question whether the plaintiff at the time of the accident was a
guest of the defendant, contending that the plaintiff was a guest as a
matter of law. The Appellate Court held the submission of the plaintiff's
status to the jury for determination was error because the plaintiff was
not a guest as a matter of law. In affirming the judgment, the Court
held that an automobile host-guest relationship requires an invitation
and an acceptance; that the plaintiff, being under seven, was at law
incapable mentally of accepting the defendant's invitation, just as a
child under seven under the common law of Indiana is legally incapable
of crime and contributory negligence; that (the guest statute being inapplicable) the defendant owed the duty to exercise reasonable care for
the safety of his charge.
Guest statutes, which have been adopted by a number of states,
including Illinois, 3 abrogate the liability which is imposed by the common law for failure to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the
safety of social guests 4 and impose liability only for "willful and wanton
misconduct," "gross negligence," "heedlessness," "reckless disregard
of others' rights," "intentional injury," etc., or a combination of these
depending on the particular statute. The reasons usually assigned for
the adoption of guest statutes are: (1) the ingratitude of gratuitous riders
in bringing suits against their benefactors;5 (2) the temptation of collusive suits where an insurance company is the true defendant. 6
The Court's decision that an infant under seven is incapable of accepting an invitation raises the question of what constitutes an acceptance and whether, as the Indiana court holds, it is necessary. Most
statutes omit mention of acceptance by the guest, but the California
8 "No person riding in a motor vehicle as a guest, without payment for such
ride, nor his personal representative in the event of the death of such guest, shall
have a cause of action for damages against the driver or operator of such motor
vehicle or its owner or his employee or agent for injury, death or loss, in case of
accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the wilful and wanton
misconduct of the driver or operator of such motor vehicle or its owner or his
employee or agent and unless such wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to
the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939,
Ch. 95 , § 58a.
4 42 C. J. 1055, Motor Vehicles, § 803. Another view that only slight care is owed
the gratuitous rider was adopted by the courts of a few states recognizing degrees
of negligence; see 42 C. J. 1056, citing Georgia, Massachusetts, and Washington
cases.
5 "The situation that this section was apparently designed to prevent is well
known. As the use of automobiles became almost universal, the proverbial ingratitude of the dog that bites the hand that feeds him, found a counterpart in the
many cases that arose, where generous drivers, having offered rides to guests,
later found themselves defendants in cases that often turned upon close questions
of negligence. Undoubtedly, the Legislature, in adopting this act, reflected a certain natural feeling as to the injustice of such a situation." Crawford v. Foster,
110 Cal. App. 81, 293 P. 841, 843 (1930); see also 11 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 24.
6 "The Legislature, at the time of enacting the section referred to, evidently had
in mind the redress of an obvious wrong, to wit, the readiness with which both
driver and guest would pool issues to exact tribute from an insurance company."
Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 245, 44 P. (2d) 478, 482 (1935); see also 11 U. of
Cin. L. Rev. 24.
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statute provides: " '. .. the term "guest" is hereby defined as being a
person who accepts a ride in any vehicle without giving compensation
therefore.' "7 California courts have therefore incorporated "accept" in
their definition of a guest s which the Ohio courts have borrowed. 9 Other
states have said an automobile guest is one "who is the recipient of the
voluntary hospitality of the owner and operator of an automobile" 10 or
"a person received and entertained in the automobile of another.""
The acceptance feature of the California statute and its absence
from the statutes of other states have not escaped attention. In referring
to the Iowa statute, the California Appellate Court remarked: "This
action specifically refers to persons being transported without payment,
etc., and apparently widens the scope and the meaning of the word
'guest,' as it does not take into consideration whether the injured person
has taken any action on his part toward becoming a guest of the owner
or operator of the vehicle involved in the accident. . . This section [of
the California statute] calls for some specific and voluntary action on
the part of a person who becomes an occupant of the vehicle. . . To be
a guest one must have accepted the ride in the vehicle involved. We
think this imports both a knowing and a voluntary acceptance, and does
not include either involuntary or a forced ride."' 12 What is the specific
voluntary action about which the Court talks? Clearly, the acceptance
need not create a valid contract inasmuch as the host-guest relationship depends for existence upon the absence of consideration. 13 There
is no requirement that the rider accept in writing or by any particular
act. To accept, apart from the law of contracts, is merely to receive
with a consenting mind, 14 and most jurisdictions would undoubtedly re7 Crawford v. Foster, supra, n. 5, p. 842.
8 Crawford v. Foster, supra, n. 5; Rocha v. Hulen, supra, n. 6; Kastel v. Stieber,
297 P. 932 (Cal. App., 1931).
9 Bailey v. Neale, 63 Ohio App. 62, 25 N. E. (2d) 310 (1939); Beer v. Beer, 52
Ohio App. 276, 3 N. E. (2d) 702 (1935); Dorn v. Village of North Olmsted, 133 Ohio
St. 375, 14 N. E. (2d) 11 (1938).
10 Linn v. Nored, 133 S. W. (2d) 234 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939).
11 Chanson v. Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S. S. Co., 18 La. App. 602, 136 So.
647, 649 (1931). See also 5 Am.Jur. 634, Automobiles, § 239: "The fact that a person pays no compensation but is riding for pleasure upon invitation of the owner
or operator gives him the status of a guest."
12 Rocha v. Hulen, supra, n. 6, p. 482; Morgan v. Anderson, 149 Kan. 814, 89
P. (2d) 866, 868 (1939): "In the two other California cases, Rocha v. Hulen, 6
Cal. App. (2d) 245, 44 P. (2d) 478, and Kastel v. Stieber, 215 Cal. 37, 8 P. (2d) 474,
stress is laid by the court upon the word 'accept' in the California statute. The
statute covers the case of a 'guest' who 'accepts' free transportation. Neither
the Wyoming nor the Kansas statute has such a provision."
13 Linn v. Nored, supra, n. 10; Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581
(1931).
14 Webster's New International Dictionary (1936).
15 But see Linn v. Nored, supra, n. 10, p. 236, where it was said: "While this
evidence was conflicting as to whether appellant was so drunk that he did not
know what he was doing when he entered the automobile and started the trip, the
trial court concluded that if he were he was nevertheless a guest within the contemplation of the statute . . .We sustain this conclusion of the trial court." See
also Commonwealth v. Regan, 182 Mass. 22, 64 N. E. 407 (1902), where in referring to an innkeeper's guest, Chief Justice Holmes said: "According to the
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quire that the guest so accept. 15 It would not seriously be contended that
the guest statute of any state would ordinarily apply to one riding under
duress of the owner or operator. The effect of the different wording of
the California statute seems more imagined than real.
The real difficulty is encountered in determining whether an infant
under seven can accept. Such an infant, of course, can have the benefit
of the hospitality of the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, but can
he receive it with a consenting mind, or does the law treat him as
powerless to consent as in the instant case? Further, what is the effect
of a parent's or guardian's consent?
It has been judicially recognized that a different treatment of children under seven is arbitrary and not in accord with reason since understanding rather than age should be the criterion of responsibility for
one's acts, but the practice is justified by the observation that "an imperfect rule is better than none."' 16 It is obvious that collusion is just
as possible where an action is brought on behalf of an infant under
seven as by anyone else. One writer, however, stresses that if a child
is mentally incapable of attending school, he cannot understand that he
is a guest and he would be incapable of ingratitude, the other factor
17
motivating the passage of the guest statutes.
The Court did not discuss the effect of the consent or want of consent of plaintiff's parents to her riding with defendant, but did state
that there was evidence that defendant had been instructed by the
parents to put the plaintiff to bed at 7:30 and that it was undisputed
that the ride started about that time without the knowledge or consent
of the parents. Other courts have been careful to point out, in holding
infants of seven and of four and one-half years, respectively, to be
guests, that even though the parents did not expressly consent, in the
one case no directions or admonitions were given against taking the
infant on an automobile trip,' 8 and in the other the consent of the temporary custodian was not negatived. 19 On the other hand, in holding not
to be guests infants of eight 20 and five, 21 the courts emphasized the
lack of the parents' knowledge of or consent to the transportation of
their children. It is not clear whether the Court would hold that an infant under seven cannot be an automobile guest under any circumstance
or merely without the consent of a parent or guardian. There would
seem room for doubt whether an infant under seven can be deprived
of the right of reasonable care by the consent of another to his transportation.
common usage of English speech, the word 'guest' signifies a relation determined
by outward circumstances, not by inward intent."
18 Maskaliunas v. The Chicago and Western Indiana R. Co., 318 Ill. 142, 149
N. E. 23 f1925).
17 11 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 24. Another writer suggests that in applying a guest
statute to an infant a more important factor would be his "capacity to recognize
the risk involved in automotive transportation, and the legal consequences of
sharing it as a guest." 15 Wash. L. Rev. 87.
Is Morgan v. Anderson, supra, n. 12.
19 Balian v. Ogassian, 277 Mass. 525, 179 N. E. 232 (1931).
20 Kastel v. Stieber, supra, n. 8.
21 Rocha v. Hulen, supra, n. 6.
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Confusion is met with where courts have applied to infants statutes
restricting the rights and powers of the individual. New Jersey passed
a law providing that "if any person shall be injured by an engine or
car while walking, standing or playing ob any railroad . . . he shall
be deemed to have contributed to the injury sustained, and shall not
recover therefor any damages from the company owning or operating
said railroad ....
"22 The Supreme Court of New Jersey held the
statute applicable to a twenty-one-month old infant. 23 A case subsequently arose in the Federal Courts involving the application of that
same statute to an infant of seven. The infant recovered a judgment in
the trial court which was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but
on appeal to the Supreme Court, the statute was held to apply to the
plaintiff. 24 An Indiana statute requires that to save an action for damages against a municipality, notice must be given. The Indiana Supreme
Court held the requirement applicable to a nine-year old child notwithstanding justice would have been better subserved if an exception were
made. 25 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, held a similar statute
26
not to apply to a seven-year old child.
The decision of the Indiana Court in the instant case appeals to
22 See Erie Railroad Company v. Hilt, 247 U. S. 97, 38 S. Ct. 435, 62 L. Ed. 1003
(1918).
23 Barcolini v. Atlantic City & S. R. Co., 82 N.J. L. 107, 81 A. 494 (1911).
24 Erie Railroad Company v. Hilt, supra, n. 22, 247 U. S. 97, 100: Justice Holmes
remarked: "The ground of the decision seemingly is that the statute does not
appear beyond doubt to apply to very young infants, although the word 'playing'
sufficiently indicates that it had minors in view, even if the absoluteness of the
opening phrase 'any person' were not enough to exclude the reading in of exceptions by the court. The words of the statute seem to us to require a different
construction from that adopted, and they have been given their full literal meaning by the supreme court of the state in the case of an infant younger than the
plaintiff . . .In view of the importance of that tribunal in New Jersey, although
not the highest court in the state, we see no reason why it should not be followed
by the courts of the United States, even if we thought its decision more doubtful
than we do." Mr. Justice Day and Mr. Justice Clarke were of the opinion that
in the absence of a decision of the highest court of New Jersey holding otherwise,
the Circuit Court of Appeals was right in holding the statute inapplicable to a
child of seven.
25 Sherfey v. City of Brazil, 213 Ind. 493, 13 N. E. (2d) 568 (1938), citing Touhey
v. City of Decatur, 175 Ind. 98, 93 N. E. 540 (1911); Peoples v. City of Valparaiso,
178 Ind. 673, 100 N. E. 70 (1912).
26 McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E. 476, 477 (1918):
"Statutes general in their terms are frequently construed to contain exceptions,
when considered in connection with well-known rules of law, without the courts
being subjected to the criticism of having entered the legislative field . . .From
time immemorial the status of a minor of tender years has been recognized in
law to be different from that of one of more mature years . . .The recognition,
by the law, of the status of infants, and of their exemption up to a certain age
from liability under the law, is so well known that it must be presumed that the
Legislature, in enacting such a statute as the one under consideration, did not
intend by the general language used to include within its provisions a class of
persons which the law has universally recognized to be utterly devoid of responsibility." (Followed in Costello v. City of Aurora, 295 Ill. App. 510, 15 N. E. (2d)
38 (1938).)
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the sense of fairness. One who transports another in an automobile
must know that his failure to exercise ordinary care may result in
injury or death to one riding with him and is morally obligated, at
least, to exercise a degree of care commensurate with potential dangers.
By holding the plaintiff not a guest, the Court has avoided violating the
policy of Indiana Courts of holding infants and adults alike subject to
legislation unless expressly exempted by the terms thereof. The Court
has, however, embarked on an extension of the doctrine originating in
criminal law regarding incapacity of an infant under seven. Illinois,
having not only respected that incapacity in dealing with crimes and
contributory negligence of an infant but having also exempted infants
from legislation general in its terms of application, 27 would appear to
have sufficient grounds for declaring its guest statute not applicable to
infants under seven.
It might be argued that if a child under seven cannot become an
automobile guest under any circumstances or unless with the consent
of a parent or guardian, then he likewise cannot become a business
guest or invitee of the owner of real property or the guest of an innkeeper under any circumstances or unless with the consent of a parent
or guardian. There is no reason to presume, however, that the doctrine
will be extended to discriminate against rather than in favor of an infant by depriving him of the rights of such guests.
R. K. MERRILL
COMMERCE-LICENSES

AND

PRIVILEGE

TAXES-DoEs

SPECIAL

FEE

APPLIC-

ABLE ONLY TO THE REGISTRATION OF AUTOMOBILES PURCHASED OUTSIDE THE STATE
VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.-The Supreme Court of Illinois in Clements

v. Hughes,' declared unconstitutional that part of Section 77b of the Motor
Vehicle Anti-theft Act of 19392 which imposes a special fee of $25 for the
registration of a new motor vehicle brought into the State of Illinois by
its owner if application for registration is made within ninety-days from
the date of acquisition.
27 McDonald v. The City of Spring Valley, supra, n. 26.
1 375 Ill.
170, 30 N. E. (2d) 643 (1940).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95 , § 77 (b): "Whenever a new motor vehicle for
which a certificate of title has not been previously issued is purchased from a

dealer the application for a certificate of title shall include a bill of sale or statement of transfer by the dealer and of any lien retained by such dealer. The applicant for a certificate of title for a motor vehicle purchased in any other state
having a certificate of title law shall submit with his application the certificate
of title issued by such other state. If the applicant is a resident of this State and
has not secured a certificate of title in such other state or legally recorded the

purchase of the motor vehicle or registered the same as may be required by the
laws of the state in which such vehicle was purchased, or if such applicant has
secured a certificate of title in such other state or so recorded or registered the
same therein but has not owned such motor vehicle under such certificate, recordation or registration for a[t] least 90 days prior to his application for a certificate
of title in this State, he shall pay the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) to the
Secretary of State who shall thereupon cause an investigation to be made to
determine whether the applicant is the owner of the motor vehicle. Upon being
satisfied of such ownership, the Secretary of State shall issue a certificate of
title in accordance with the terms of this Act."
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The provision of the United States Constitution concerning interstate commerce3 is well recognized as not precluding a State from indirectly affecting interstate commerce by regulation under its police
powers or by exercise of its taxing power. Taxation may thus be resorted to for the purpose of defraying the State's expenses in administering and enforcing regulatory Acts and as compensation for the use
of the facilities offered to navigation 4 , road users 5 or aircraft. 6 Private
use of the roads by nonresidents is subject to this tax burden; 7 and
commercial use of the highways is usually subject to compensatory
taxation to cover the expense of policing the highways, also for their
repair and maintenance, and even for anticipated improvementss Interstate commerce must pay its way.
The Western States have been preoccupied by large scale immigration and migration of automobiles in groups or caravans and have adopted special legislation to cope with this problem by attempting to discourage such commerce. In 1935, legislation of this type by the State
of New Mexico was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States9
as non-discriminating because applying to both interstate and intrastate
movement of used cars for sale. In 1936, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California held' 0 that the California
Statute, which required a ninety-day waiting period between application
for registration of a used car of foreign origin and issuance of the
registration, was intended to operate as a prohibition of competition by
importation of cars from other states and amounted to an improper
confiscation of property during the ninety-day period. Another case, decided the same year by the same tribunal," likewise declared unconstitutional a charge of $15 upon each car entering California on its own
wheels for sale, because unjustified when applied to single cars.
In 1938, however, the United States Supreme Court upheld 12 a charge
of $7.50 per car for the use of the highway plus a charge of $7.50 per
car as a license fee for the privilege of engaging in the used car business;
the Court pointed out that the movement of single cars, although covered
by the language of the Statute, was in fact negligible and not involved
in the case, which is thus distinguishable from the preceding upon the
interpretation of the facts.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Illinois refers to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States involving the New
3 U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, (3).

4 Clyde Mallory Lines vs. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 56 S. Ct. 194, 80 L. Ed. 215
(1935); Ross v. Borough of Edgewater, 116 N. J. L. 447, 184 A. 810 (1936).
5 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385 (1914); Kane
v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed 222 (1916).
6 Varney Air Lines v. Babcock, 1 F. Supp. 687 (1932).
7 Supra, n. 5.
s Liberty Highway Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, 294 Fed. 703
(1923).
9 Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U. S. 407, 56 S. Ct. 756, 80 L. Ed. 1245 (1936).
10 Asher v. Ingels, 13 F. Supp. 654 (1936).
11 Morf v. Ingels, 14 F. Supp. 922 (1936).
12 Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583, 59 S. Ct. 744, 83 L. Ed. 1001 (1939).
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Mexico and California Statutes, but decides that they are not applicable
to the situation at hand. This position is well justified because
the analogy is rather to the earlier California Statute requiring a ninetyday quarantine, since the Illinois Statute imposes the special $25 registration fee upon cars brought into the State less than ninety-days after
acquisition, without any relation between the amount demanded and the
expenses of the State. It is not a charge for the use of the highway and
the funds go into the general funds of the State.
It is true that the Illinois provision does not affect automobiles in
transit nor at their entry into the State and that the taxing power of the
sovereign State may be exercised upon all property within its jurisdiction regardless of the origin of such property; but in *the instant case,
taxation was not applied regardless of the origin of the property taxed,
since the tax was applicable only to automobiles which had been imported into the State and not to those manufactured in Illinois. This was
a discrimination based upon the interstate origin of the property, violating the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. This is in harmony with
the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of North Carolina in Park McLain, Inc. v. Hoey, 13 although it is opposed
to the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in State ex rel. v. Coleman,14 both cases involved a fee for filing a required title bond for
used cars.
Illinois does not apparently receive an excessive number of used
cars, but new cars are manufactured or assembled here. This may explain the peculiarity of the Illinois provision, which consists in its applicability only to new cars, whereas all similar cases found relate to
used cars. The absence of proof or allegation of any reason for a distinction between new and used cars was pointed out by the Court in the
instant case, and was made a further ground of invalidity.
The amount of the Illinois special registration fee, $25, although
having no relation to the State's expenses in connection with the protection of automobiles against theft, nor with the cost of administering
the Act, corresponds fairly enough with the amount which the purchaser
of a new car of an average price of $833 would have to pay to the State as
a 3 per cent occupational tax on a local sale. Probably this particular
provision of the Act was intended to fill in a possible gap in the collection of the retailers' occupational tax, at the same time inducing purchasers to buy at home and thus protect local distributors of new cars
against competitors in other states.
If such a tax was admittedly and expressly imposed as an equivalent
of an occupational tax in a proper revenue provision, would it be valid?
Use taxes are now recognized and in force in many States. They are
levied on the privilege of using an article, but in fact are measured by
the sales price and thus are really a tax on the privilege of purchasing. 15
13 19 F. Supp. 990 (1937).
15 See 45 Yale L. J. 708 (1936).

14

123 Fla. 23, 166 So. 226 (1936).
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A Pennsylvania tax on "use or sales and delivery" has been upheld by
the United States Supreme Court' 6 and many cases have upheld taxes
on use, 17 on storage for use,' 8 on storage, 19 and on withdrawal from
storage, 20 although in each case it was contended that interstate commerce was improperly burdened and discriminated against.
A tax on the use of a motor vehicle on which sales tax has previously been paid to the State seems a proper exercise of the State's
taxing power, as the California Use tax illustrates. As applied to a situation like that in the principal case, a new question would arise where
the State of origin collects a sales tax, and the purchaser would have
to pay such sales tax even if the sale is there made for the purpose of
exportation to another State, 21 and the State of destination would claim
a use tax. Then, interstate commerce would .be burdened by double
taxation. It would pay its way twice. The United States Supreme Court
22
It is
has now in two instances at least avoided deciding the point.
submitted that there would be indeed a case of multiple taxation, and
that the mere fear of such multiple taxation would result in causing
residents to avoid dealing with out-of-State sellers. In fact the sales tax
in the State of origin as well as the sale or use tax in the State of destination are burdens on interstate commerce. But this is accepted because
now the emphasis is placed upon the relative amount of the burden
placed on interstate and on intrastate commerce, both being admittedly
burdened.
The possible correlative to such a tax as a use tax here suggested
might be either (1) an exemption from the tax by the State of destination where a sales tax or occupational tax has been paid in the State of
origin, or a credit upon the tax to the extent of the amount paid to such
State of origin, or (2) exemption from the sales tax by the State of
origin, as an encouragement to interstate commerce. The first possibility
has already received practical application in some States having a use
tax, such as Washington. 23 The second possibility might be an attempt
to favor local industry and trade, and amount in most cases to a discrimination in favor of interstate commerce. It would tend too readily
to produce retaliatory taxation by the State of destination, as is the
case in foreign commerce between nations, and thus would readily beWiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169, 55 S. Ct. 358, 79 L. Ed. 838 (1935).
Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642, 41 S. Ct. 606, 65 L. Ed. 1139
(1921).
18 Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 S. Ct. 631, 76 L. Ed. 1232 (1932).
19 Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 59 S. Ct. 389, 83 L. Ed. 586
(1939). Discussed in 27 Cal. L. Rev. 549 (1939).
20 Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, 289 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 591, 77 L. Ed. 1155
(1933). Discussed in 24 Cal. L. Rev. (1936).
21 Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 285 U. S. 147,
52 S. Ct. 340, 76 L. Ed. 673 (1932).
22 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524, 81 L. Ed. 814 (1937);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 59 S. Ct. 389, 83 L. Ed. 586 (1939).
28 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524, 81 L. Ed. 814 (1937).
Discussed in 52 Harv. L. Rev. 617 (1939) and in 38 Col. L. Rev. 49 (1938).
16

17
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come more advantageous to the State of destination. But such a possibility is out of the realm of this comment since it would immediately
raise grave questions of constitutionality and of public policy.
And further, in the instant case, the provision was found in the
Motor Vehicle Anti-theft Act and therefore could not be considered as
a taxing provision, in view of the fact that the Constitution of Illinois
provides that "No Act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one
' 24
subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
It seems that a special charge upon motor vehicles originating outside of the State, if not exacted as a use tax in a revenue Act, can be
justified only if based upon actual investigation of the title in the State
of origin and representing a return for the beneficial protection which
might thus be afforded against theft, based upon the reasonable cost of
such an investigation. It should also be applicable alike to new and
used cars, unless some justification for a distinction can be advanced.
Also, the purpose of the Act here in question might be satisfied by requiring simply a title bond and a reasonable fee upon its filing.
G. MscmNoT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-INJUNCTIONs AGAINST PICKETATTEMPTS TO UNIONIE.-For a long time the States, through their
courts, have been able to exercise the power of injunction irrespective
of anti-injunction statutes, or of a common law which follows the pattern defined by the Clayton Act. This has been done by interpretation
of the terms "peaceful" and "labor dispute."' The Illinois Supreme
Court in the case of Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union2
interpreted "labor dispute" to mean a dispute between parties standing
in an employer-employee relationship as prescribed by the Clayton Act.
This relationship not being present, the court granted an injunction
restraining peaceful picketing. 3 In the case of Swing v. American Federation of Labor4 the Illinois Supreme Court again followed this interpretation, and, influenced by acts of violence and libel, granted an injunction.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing the decision of
the Illinois Supreme Court in the Swing case,5 held that an employeremployee relationship was not an essential element in the definition of
"labor dispute." Having come to this conclusion, the Supreme Court
then decided that the issuing of an injunction predicated solely on the
absence of the employer-employee relationship was a violation of the
constitutional guarantee of the freedom of speech.
In the Swing case an employer, owner of a beauty parlor, left the
question of union membership to his employees. The employees decided
not to join and as a consequence the Union picketed Swing's shop.
Swing and his employees then sought an injunction in an Illinois Circuit

ING IN

Ill. Const. of 1870, Art. IV, § 13.
1 Frank E. Cooper, "The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing," 35 Mich. L. Rev. 73
377, 21 N.E. (2d) 308 (1939).
(1936).
2 371 Ill.
24

3 Note, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 385 (1939).
4 372 Ill. 91, 22 N.E. (2d) 857 (1939).
5

-U.S.-, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. (adv.) 513 (1941).
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Court. The case went, on appeal, to the Illinois Supreme Court which
found that there were two minor acts of violence to customers, that the
banners carried by the Union contained libelous statements, and that no
"labor dispute" existed in that no employer-employee relationship was
involved. The injunction was granted. The United States Supreme Court
disregarded the elements of violence, but looking only to the injunction
stated:
"We are asked to sustain a decree which for purposes of this case
asserts as the common law of a state that there can be no 'peaceful
picketing or peaceful persuasion' in relation to any dispute between an
employer and a trade union unless the employer's own employees are in
controversy with him." 6
The wisdom of incorporating the employer-employee requirement
into anti-injunction statutes has been questioned. 7 The overthrowing of
such a requirement in the Federal Courts was the result of the NorrisLa Guardia Act. 8 The Supreme Court's reason for imposing a similiar
rule upon the States may be found in a statement of the Supreme Court
in the case of United States v. Hutcheson:
"More especially, the Act [Norris-La Guardia Act] explicitly formulated
the public policy of the United States in regard to the industrial conflict,
and by its light established that the allowable area of union activity was
not to be restricted, as it had been in the Duplex . . . case, to an immediate employer-employee relation.''
The reasoning which supports the more liberal construction of the
term "labor dispute" has been stated and relied on by the Supreme
Court in many instances. In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council,'0 the court pointed out that the effectiveness of unions
depended on the extent of their enrollment throughout an industry, and
that employee-members have an interest in the wages and the hours of
other workers who are engaged in similiar occupations and who are
employed in the same neighborhood. In the case of Senn v. Tile Layers
Protective Union," the Union's right to act was predicated on its right
to protect its members from the harmful effect of an employer working
in place of a union employee. In the Apex case, 12 the court stated that a
6 Ibid., 85 L.Ed. (adv.) at p. 515.
7 Note, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 896 (1927).
8 United States v. Hutcheson, et al.,-U.S.-, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. (adv.) 422
(1941).
9 Ibid., 85 L.Ed. (adv.) at p. 424.
10 257 U.S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189, 27 A.L.R. 360 (1921). In this case the
strike was conducted by a union having only two members who were employees
of the foundry. In maintaining the right of non-employee pickets to use peaceful
persuasion, the court gave some consideration to the facts that the plant was not
running near capacity and that many of the employees were old men. For these
reasons the striking men would likely be future employees of the foundry.
11 301, U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229 (1937). In this case the court was
concerned with construction of the Wisconsin Statute. Furthermore, they realized
the interest of non-employee members of a union in preventing a situation which
would encourage conduct harmful to their union.
12 Apex Hosiery Co. v, Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128
A.L.R. 1044 (1940).
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labor combination to be effective must eliminate non-union-made goods.
Whether or not these reasons are sufficient for refusing an injunction,
when a union interferes with both the employer's right to carry on his
business and the employee's right to work, need no longer be questioned.
It is clear that statutes having the scope of the Illinois Act are no
longer necessary nor are they of any effect. The recent attempts of
some states to limit the scope originally given their anti-injunction
statutes' 3 have failed. What the future rule is to be in regards to relationship, by which the states may grant injunctions, is not prescribed by the
Supreme Court. The language previously quoted from the Hutcheson
case suggests that the definition of a labor dispute as set forth in the
Norris-La Guardia Act will be generally accepted. 14 The only decision
touching on this question is that in the case of Blanford v. Press Publishing Company.15 There the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, after reviewing the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining the
right of free speech in labor disputes, overruled all its previous decisions,
which decisions were predicated upon an employer-employee relationship, and held that a union, in the absence of violence, may not be enjoined from picketing anyone against whom it has a grievance. 16
From the above discussion it will be seen that the term "peaceful"
is the only element which the states may freely interpret in deciding
picketing-injunction problems. A discussion of the efforts of states and
cities to enjoin picketing by the use of statutes and ordinances will not
be attempted here, 17 but it may be generally stated that in all these
cases the attempt has failed because the legislation was open to interpretations broad enough to enjoin peaceful picketing. Given such an interpre13 Recent Developments Regarding Picketing and Boycotting, 6 J. Marsh. L. Q.
83 (1940). Many states, notably Wisconsin, following the Senn case, attempted to
retract from the extent of the protection given unions. This result was obtained
by denying injunctions only where a majority of the employees was striking.
14 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115. § 111-(c) provides that a labor dispute "includes any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiation, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
§ Ill-(b) provides that a person is "participating or interested in a labor dispute
. . . if he . . . is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation, in
which the dispute occurs . . . or is affiliated with a union having members so
engaged.
15 C.C.H. Labor Law Service 60,935 decided February 28, 1941.
16 In this case the Union was attempting to force a publishing company to
unionize. The employer was willing, but unable, to comply; so the Union boycotted
him. The court refused to grant the injunction after reviewing Thornhill v. State
of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940), Carlson v. State of
California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104, (1940), and the Swing and
Meadowmoor cases. A similar result was reached under the Norris La-Guardia
Act in Lauf v. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 58 S.Ct. 578, 82 L. Ed. 872 (1938).
17 For a discussion of the recent cases in which statutes enjoining picketing
have been struck down see 130 A.L.R. 1303 and 125 A.L.R. 963. Also see I. R.
Feinberg, "Picketing, Free Speech, and 'Labor Disputes' " 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev.
385 (1940).
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tation the legislation violated the constitutional right of free speech.' 8
The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that it will not strike down
statutes giving the state courts power to grant injunctions where there
is violence, nor will it strike down a narrowly drawn statute to cover
"picketing en masse or otherwise conducted which might occasion imminent and aggravated danger." 19
What is considered violence and therefore enjoinable has received
wide treatment.2 0 In this regard the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the Meadowmoor case is important. This decision
left to the states an opportunity to control certain phases of the picketing
problem without violating the right of free speech, by holding that the
effect of past violence is to render the present peaceful picketing
coercive and, therefore enjoinable. 21 The Illinois Supreme Court, in its
decision on this case, although affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court, did not discuss the question of past violence, but based its decision on the ground that the picketing was an unlawful interference
with the employer's property right, and that this right is superior to the
right of free speech, when the employer-employee relationship element
is not present in the "labor dispute."
Thus, by the decisions in the Swing case and the Meadowmoor case
the Supreme Court has established the extent of the constitutional
guarantee of free speech in labor disputes. As long as a union promotes
the interests of its members in better wages and working conditions,
it can peacefully picket any party affecting this interest, but if past
violence renders peaceful acts coercive the state may enjoin such peaceful acts. What will constitute violence is within the discretion of the
state courts, but since the right of free speech is involved, the Supreme
22
Court may pass on the reasonableness of their findings.
W. S. NORDBURG.
To AppoiNT-PuBLIc LIAASSET OF NONRESIDENT INTESTATE SUPPORTING
GRANT OF ADMINISTRATION.-On September 6, 1936, P. L. Brady, a resident
of Missouri was killed when his car collided with that of one Furst in
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18 Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed.
(adv.) 497, 499 (1941).
19 Ibid. 85 L.Ed. (adv.) at p. 499. "We would not strike down a statute which
authorized the courts of Illinois to prohibit picketing when they should find that
violence had given to the picketing a coercive effect whereby it would operate
destructively as force and intimidation." 85 L.Ed. (adv.) at p. 501.
20 For a discussion of what has been held to be violence see note 1, supra.
21 This case involved an effort by the Milk Wagon Drivers Union, which was
composed of employees of certain Chicago dairies, to eliminate the so-called
"vendor" system of selling milk. By this system, the milk is sold and delivered
by independent contractors. In the early years of the dispute, 1934 particularly,
there were bombings and dumpings of trucks. The injunction sustained, moreover, enjoined all picketing on the grounds that this early violence so tainted the
picketing that it was necessarily coercive. For a further consideration of the case
see note, 41 Col. L.Rev. 727 (1941).
22 Meadowmoor Case, supra, n. 18.
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Stephenson County, Illinois. Two weeks after the accident Brady's son
sold the car in Illinois and applied the payment on doctor's bills.
Five months later the public administrator petitioned for letters
of administration, listing as assets Brady's wrecked car and a public
liability insurance policy, issued by a Missouri Corporation, licensed to
do business in Illinois. The policy, itself, was in Missouri at the time of
Brady's death. The Stephenson County Court granted the letters and
on the same day, three actions ex delicto were filed against the administrator, two for personal injuries to passengers in Furst's car and
one for the wrongful death of Furst, who died as a result of the accident. After one of the personal injury suits had proceeded to judgment
against the administrator, an heir of Brady's filed a petition alleging
that the county court was without jurisdiction to appoint an administrator and asked that the letter of administration be revoked. The
county court granted the petition and the Appellate Court affirmed the
decision.' The Supreme Court, in reversing the Appellate Court, 2 stated
at the outset of its opinion that "the issue is one of jurisdiction and
not whether, under the facts, it was necessary to make the appointment." "Jurisdiction," as here used, is taken to mean, not the power
of the court over the general type of subject matter, but the existence
of jurisdictional facts in this particular case, i.e. principally, whether
there were any assets to sustain the appointment of an administrator
and incidentally whether there were creditors of the estate.
The Supreme Court excluded from consideration the car as an
asset3 and found the liability policy, with no other estate of record,
sufficient to warrant the appointment of an administrator. The court's
theory was that the insurance contract in question, not being under
seal, was not a specialty, 4 but in the nature of a chose in action, 5 that
the insurer being licensed to do business in this state, is regarded as a
resident of Illinois, 6 and, section 10, of the Wills Act, 7 in existence at
the time the proceedings here originated, located the contract where
the debtor resided.8 Thus having decided the insurance contract had a
1 In re Brady's Estate, 303 Ill. App. 139, 24 N.E. (2d) 748 (1940), 19 CHICAGOKENT LAw REviEw 114 (1940), 29 Ill. B. J. 142 (1940).
2 Furst v. Brady, 375 Ill. 425, 31 N.E. (2d) 606 (1941).
3 While the wrecked car had been sold before the petition was filed, it would
appear that that fact alone would not deprive the county court of the right to
grant administration thereon, the question of necessity not being raised. The existence of assets in the state at the date of death should furnish the jurisdictional
fact required. In re Barlass' Estate, 143 Wis. 497, 128 N.W. 58 (1910).
4 Barrett v. Hinckley, 124 Ill. 32, 14 N.E. 863 (1888).
5 Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 83 N.E. 542, 14 L.R.A., (N.S.)
356, 122 Am. St. Rep. 54, 13 Ann. Cas. 129 (1908).
6 Charles Friend & Co. v. Goldsmith & Seidel Co., 307 Ill. 45, 138 N.E. 185
(1923); Chicago, Danville & Vincennes Railroad Co. v. Bank of North America,
82 Ill. 493 (1876).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939 Ch. 148, § 10, "...
where the instrument happens to be, and
choses in action where the debtor resides."
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 207, now
and unsealed contracts but provides that

the situs of specialty debts shall be
of simple contract debts and other
makes no distinction between sealed
the situs of intangible personalty is
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situs in Illinois, 9 the court held it to be an asset of Brady's estate in
Stephenson County and as there were unsatisfied claims of creditors
the county court had jurisdiction and the duty to appoint an administrator.
The precise question hasn't been passed upon before in Illinois,
and authority squarely in point is by no means common elsewhere. The
issue was apparently decided for the first time in Robinson v. Dana's
Estate.'0 In that case the only asset was a policy of liability insurance
issued by an insurer, claims thereunder being actionable in any county
in New Hampshire. The insured decedent was at no time an inhabitant
of the county in which the administrator was appointed. The New
Hampshire court held that the right to appoint does not depend upon
the probable merits of the decedent's claim and that while a liability
insurance policy is not an asset constituting "estate" to the decedent at
his death, nor to his heirs or next of kin thereafter, yet insofar as it
is needed to pay debts it is an asset of the estate and appointment of
an administrator was proper.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Gordon v. Shea"
upheld, on similar facts, the appointment of an administratrix of a nonresident decedent who had died after damage suits were instituted. The
Massachusetts court further held that the showing of a prima facie
case of tort liability on the part of the decedent was sufficient to establish the claimant as a "creditor" within the meaning of the Administration Act.
As the decision in the instant case is based solely on the question
of jurisdiction, it would seem that the necessity of appointment might
still be challenged by proper petition, in view of the former commitments
of the Illinois Supreme Court to the effect that administration is not
necessary in every estate, and since the statute applies only to those
12
cases where it is necessary.
In Cotterell v. Coen,'3 the Supreme Court uses this language, "The
purpose and object of requiring administration to be had upon estates
"where the instrument evidencing a debt, obligation, stock or chose in action
happens to be...."
"Instrument" has not yet been defined as here used but
if held applicable to insurance policies, would the result now be changed under
the facts of the instant case where the policy is not in Illinois at the time of
decedent's death?
9 An insurance contract issued by an insurer licensed to do business in Illinois,
has been held to have a situs in Illinois for purposes of garnishment. Lancashire
Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, 165 Ill.
592, 46 N.E. 631, 36 L.R.A. 640 (1897). See also:
Roche v. Rhode Island Ins. Ass'n, 2 Ill. App. 360 (1878); Glover v. Wells, 140 11.
102, 29 N.E. 680 (1892).
10 87 N.H. 114, 174 A. 772, 94 A.L.R. 1437 (1934).
1 300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E. (2d) 105 (1938).
12 Cotterell v. Coen, 246 Ill.
410, 92 N.E. 911 (1910); Lynch v. Rotan, 39 Ill.
14
(1865); Riley v. Loughey, Adm'r, 22 Ill. 98 (1859); Lewis v. Lyons, 13 Ill.
117 (1851);
Dupee v. Folett, 304 Ill.
166, 136 N.E. 543 (1922); Martin v. Central Trust Co.,
327 Ill.
622, 159 N.E. 312 (1927); People, for use of McKee v. Abbott, 105 Ill.
588
(1883).
13 246 Ill.
410, 92 N.E. 911 (1910).
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of persons dying intestate is to provide for and insure, first, the conservation of all the personal assets of the estate, including the collection of all debts due the decedent, second, the payment of all the
debts of the decedent. . . ." It seems clear therefore that if a debtorcreditor relationship is once established between the deceased's estate
and the tort claimant, the liability policy would become an asset and
the appointment of an administrator would be both proper and necessay.
The courts of other states have almost uniformly held that an action
for wrongful death, as an asset of the decedent's estate, justifies ap14
Alpointing an administrator for purposes of prosecuting the action.
though these actions are governed by statute, they indicate a policy
of not discriminating between claims or assets available for all creditors
and those which are limited to a particular class. 15
In cases of liability insurance, the necessity for administration is as
obvious as in the instance of wrongful death; rights arising under either
are worthless if in the former there is no one to proceed against and
in the latter no one with authority to prosecute an action. While apparently it had not been previously decided in Illinois, other jurisdictions have held that a tort claimant is a creditor with the right to
have administration. 16 It has also been held that an uncertain claim is
an asset constituting "estate. ' 17 To reject the rather sparse authority
on the two foregoing points and repudiate the doctrine established in
Robinson v. Dana, supra, would create an absurd result. The establishment of a debtor-creditor relationship between the claimant and the
insured is an essential condition precedent to the creation of the insurer's liability. If an administrator cannot be appointed because the
claim is contingent or there are no other assets, the insurer escapes,
as there is no one for the injured person to sue in order to adjudicate
the tort liability, and, if successful, establish the necessary debtorcreditor relationship.
14 American Car & Foundry Co. v. Anderson, 211 F. 301 (1914); Southern Pacific
Co. v. De Valle Da Costa, 190 F. 689 (1911); Fickeisen v. Wheeling Electrical Co.,
67 W. Va. 335, 67 S.E. 788 (1910); Ex parte Jenkins, 25 Ind. App. 532, 58 N.E. 560,
81 Am. St. Rep. 114 (1900); Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 24 Neb. 848, 40
N.W. 401, 2 L.R.A. 67 (1888); In re Mayo's Estate, 60 S.C. 401, 38 S.E. 634 (1901):
Fann v. North Carolina R. Co., 155 N.C. 136, 71 S.E. 81 (1911); Gulf, Colorado &
Sante Fe R. Co. v. Beezley, 153 S.W. 651 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App., 1913).
15 For cases other than wrongful death making no distinction in procuring administration between claims and assets available to all creditors and those limited
to a class see notes 10 and 11, supra.
16 Ford v. Maney's Estate, 251 Mich. 461, 232 N.W. 393 (1930). One claiming unliquidated tort damages is not a "creditor," so as to be entitled to preference
right to appointment as administrator-but a petition of a tort claimant is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court to appoint any suitable person administrator.
In re Miller's Estate, 130 Wash. 199, 226 Pac. 493 (1924). Illinois cases holding that
"creditor" means tort claimant as well as contractor creditor: Waldradt v.
Brown, 6 Ill. 397 (1844); Bongard v. Block, 81 Ill. 186 (1876); Hutchinson v.
Croarkin, 87 Ill. App. 557 (1899).
17 Notes 10 and 11, supra; In re Buder's Estate, 117 Neb. 52, 219 N.W. 808 (1928);
In re Ackin's Estate, 144 Iowa 519, 123 N.W. 187 (1909). See also 21 Am. Jur. 395-6,
Executors and Administrators, § 40.
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Inasmuch as the law of the place where the accident occurred
ordinarily governs the tort liability arising therefrom,18 practical objection can seldom be made to the courts of that state being the proper
forum in which to ascertain such liability. Furthermore, the tort claimants and witnesses usually reside there and the insurer, by doing business there, has submitted to the jurisdiction of its courts. 19
Requiring the injured tort claimant to sue in the state of domicile
of the decedent has the advantage of eliminating ancillary administration but the very purpose of ancillary administration is to facilitate
the equitable disposition of estates not confined to one jurisdiction and
the objection of complication by ancillary appointment seems relatively
small in view of the possibility that the state of domicile, too, might
see fit not to appoint an administrator which would lead to the untenable result of completely exonerating the insurer without a judicial
R. N. SERVAAS
determination on the merits.
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REALTY OCCASIONED By REMOVAL.-In the recent case of In re VoightPros't Brewing Company,1 which was decided in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiff, Michael Yundt
Company, sold a bottle washer and pasteurizer, under a title-retaining
contract dated April 6, 1936, to the debtor, the Voight-Pros't Brewing
Company. This debtor had constructed a new building the previous winter, upon which his predecessor, to secure a bond issue, had executed
to the defendant, the National Bank of Detroit, a trust mortgage covering all its real and personal property then owned and thereafter to be
acquired. The machinery was brought into the building through an opening about twelve feet square which had been left in one of the walls and
which was subsequently bricked up.
While the Voight-Pros't Brewing Company was in bankruptcy under
section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 2 the seller filed a petition to restrain
the mortgagee from interfering with the reclamation of the machinery.
The District Court denied the plaintiff's petition without findings of fact
or conclusions of law by the court. On appeal by the plaintiff, the Circuit Court decided that inasmuch as the contract provided that title
should remain in the seller until the purchase price was fully paid and
that upon default, the vendor might reclaim the property and retain
payments made as damages for breach of the contract it was a true
conditional sale, there being no provision for suit for deficiency after
retaking.8
AGE TO

Rest. of the Law, Conflicts of Laws, § 377.
It has been held that a court of a county in which the insurance company is
not amenable to suit has no jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of a deceased
nonresident policy-holder. Olsen v. Preferred Automobile Ins. Co., 259 Mich. 612,
244 N.W. 178 (1932).
2 11 U. S. C. A. § 207.
1 115 F. (2d) 733 (1940).
3 The court states: "The Supreme Court of Michigan has sharply distinguished
between a 'pure conditional sale' and an 'absolute sale' with reservation of title
18
19
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The court further decided that machinery sold under a conditional
sale contract does not become the property of the debtor and is not
subject to the reorganization proceeding. 4 The defendant's contention
that the machinery became a fixture was overruled by the court, which
stated: "When personal property is of such nature that it could become
a fixture, an intention that it shall remain personalty is clearly indicated
by delivery under a conditional sale agreement providing for reclamation upon default." 5 The principle that intent does not control if the
manner of attachment is such that removal will entail substantial injury
to the freehold was accepted arguendo but held inapplicable in the instant case because the evidence showed that the brick panel could be
removed and replaced without disturbing the basic pilasters or otherwise substantially damaging the building. There was a further finding
of fact that the machine rested of its own weight on plates and that there
was no bolting of the jack-screws to the floor. Upon expressly finding
that the machinery was not a fixture it was held that the plaintiff was
entitled to reclaim, if adequate security be given that the wall would be
promptly and completely restored.
The question of compensating the holder of the real mortgage for
damage occasioned to the freehold in removing a chattel sold under a
conditional sale contract appears to be a novel but equitable addition to
the "substantial injury doctrine." While a theoretical line may still be
drawn between damage caused by severing actual fastenings such as
screws, bolts, hooks, etc. and damage caused by the removal of a chattel
not attached within the building but physically necessitating destruction
of realty to remove; it is difficult to visualize an injury more substantial
than in the instant case. Apparently, although without express mention,
heretofore the courts have felt that the right to remove, once established,
was not attendant with the duty of compensating for necessary injury
inasmuch as the conditional vendor is in no way at fault. It would appear,
however, that there are many situations involving innocent third parties
wherein the device invoked here would more readily allow the condifor security only, holding the latter to be in legal effect a chattel mortgage and
the intent of the parties the controlling factor in determining the category into
which the agreement falls." 115 F. (2d) 733, 735 (1940). Cases cited: Burroughs
Adding Machine Co. v. Wieselberg, 230 Mich. 15, 203 N. W. 160 (1925); Federal
Savings Bank v. Clay Machinery Co., 230 Mich. 33, 203 N. W. 166, 43 A. L. R. 1245
(1925).
In in re Berghoff Printing Co., 62 F. (2d) 493, 494 (1932), the test is stated:
"Where the instrument specifically reserves title in the seller, the test of this
distinction, under the Michigan cases, is whether the seller can retake the goods
and then sue for the deficiency in the sale price. If he can do both, the instrument is a mortgage; but if upon the retaking he can do no more than sue for the
rental value of the property or nonperformance of the contract, then it is a
conditional sale with title retained in the seller until he elects to sue for the
purchase price."
4 Lake's Laundry v. Braun, 296 U. S. 622, S. Ct. 144, 80 L. Ed. 442 (1935); In re
Burgemeister Brewing Co., 84 F (2d) 388 (1936); 34 Mich. L. Rev. 579 (1936).
5 115 F. (2d) 733, 735 (1940). See also Manwaring v. Jenison, 61 Mich. 117, 27
N. W. 899 (1886); Harris v. Hackley, 127 Mich. 46, 86 N. W. 389 (1901).
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tional vendor his right of reclamation, without working an undue hardship on either.
R. N. SERVAAS
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AD LITEM FOR AN INFANT DEFENDANT CAN ADMIT ANYTHING
AGAINST DEFENDANT BY His ANSwER.-In Kroot v. Liberty Bank of Chi-

cago, 1 the Illinois Appellate Court held that where an infant is a party
to a cause, and a guardian ad litem is appointed to represent him, a
judgment or decree rendered against the minor is subject to be reversed, if the guardian ad litem files an answer admitting the allegations of the complaint. Such holding, of course, is in accord with what
has long been considered the law of this state. In Stunz v. Stunz, the
Illinois Supreme Court said: "It is the duty of the guardian ad litem,
when appointed, to examine into the case and determine what the rights
of his wards are, and what defense their interest demands, and to make
such defense as the exercise of care and prudence will dictate. He is
not required to make a defense not warranted by law, but should exercise that care and judgment that reasonable and prudent men exercise,
and submit to the court for its determination all questions that may
arise, and take its advice and act under its direction in the steps necessary to preserve and secure the rights of the minor defendants. The
guradian ad litem who perfunctorily files an answer for his ward, and
then abandons the case, fails to comprehend his duties as an officer of
the court."' 2 [Italics supplied]
Consequently the guardian ad litem must make a defense as vigorous as the nature of the case permits.3 This does not mean that in the
event he feels that the interest of the minor is the same as that of the
other parties, the guardian ad litem may admit the allegations of the
complaint. It is his duty to submit to the court for its consideration and
decision every question involving the rights of his wards. 4 Strict proof
must be made in a proceeding affecting the rights of infants, 5 and the
guardian ad litem cannot bind the infants by anything he may do, or
admit in his answer. 6 Such is the public policy of this state requiring
1 307 Ill.
App. 209, 30 N. E. (2d) 92 (1940), complaint for partition and accounting filed by the minor's mother. The answer by the guardian ad litem read as
follows: "This defendant admits the allegations contained in said complaint for
partition and joins in the prayer of partition and accounting as prayed for in
said complaint." The court held that such an answer did not properly protect the
minor's interests.
2 131 Ill.210, 23 N. E. 407,'qr(1890); McCarthy v. Cain, 301 Ill. 534, 134 N. E.
62 (1922); Millage v. Noble, 334 Ill.
315, 166 N. E. 50 (1929); Schrader v. Schrader,
280 Ill.App. 561 (1935). The same rule has been expounded in many other states,
see Shaefer v. Gates, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 453, 38 Am. Dec. 164 (1842); Long v. Mulford, 17 Ohio St. 484, 93 Am. Dec. 638 (1867).
3 Sconce v. Whitney, 12 Il. 150 (1850); cited with approval in Tymony v. Tymony, 331 Ill.
420, 163 N. E. 393 (1928).
4 Stark v. Brown, 101 Ill.
395 (1882).
5 Enos v. Capps, 12 Ill. 255 (1850); Greenough v. Taylor, 17 Ill.602 (1856)).
6 Bitt v. Ormsbee, 12 Ill.
166 (1850); Enos v. Capps, 12 Ill. 255 (1850); Cochran

v. McDowell, 15 Ill.
11 (1853); Masterson v. Wiswould, 18 Ill.
48 (1856); Reddick

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

courts to guard carefully the rights of minors. 7
The instant case, however, becomes important in view of two factors: first, the dissenting opinion therein; and second, the effect of the
instant decision on the holding in Zielinski v. Pleason.8 The dissenting
opinion in the instant case states: "The decree is supported by the
record and should be affirmed. The minor while a defendant, in reality
had the same position in the litigation as the plaintiff .... I agree that the
action of the guardian ad litem was irregular. However, it is plain that
the minor was fully protected and that his asserted rights were considered and ruled on ... ."$9
It is by no means clear from an examination of the reported case
that these assertions were strictly accurate. The majority opinion points
out that the plaintiff made claim as a joint tenant to the real estate
of her deceased husband, which, if true, eliminated the otherwise legal
right of inheritance of the minor under the laws of descent. This scarcely
puts the minor in the same position as the plaintiff. Further, it is no
more apparent that the minor was fully protected and that his asserted
rights were considered and ruled on. Perhaps the minor's asserted rights
were ruled on, but who asserted those rights if the guardian ad litem,
charged by law with that duty, failed to present them? It is true that a
mere formal denial by answer, instead of an admission, would provide
perfunctory compliance with the requirements above stated, and yet
provide no greater protection than was perhaps given in the instant
case; still the guardian ad litem's duty, if properly discharged, requires
that he not only deny but also require full proof.
The suggestion in the dissent that injury must appear to justify a
reversal was expressed in the Zielinski case, in which the court said:
"... some injustice must be made to appear because of failure to appoint a guardian ad litem of a minor, before the judgment will be
vacated."' 1 Assuming that an injustice was done the minor in the instant case, then on the surface it would appear that the two cases might
be distinguished because in the one no guardian ad litem was appointed
until it was too late for him to act;" while in the other case, a guardian
ad litem was appointed but did not contest the complaint. 12 That this is
really no ground for distinction is seen from the language in McCarthy
v. Cain, in which the court said: "The appointment of a guardian ad
litem is not a mere formality, and, unless it is so, no reason can be
given for setting aside the judgment or decree against a minor without
the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent him in the suit
386 (1870);
v. State Bank of Illinois, 27 Ill.
145 (1862); Greenman v. Harvey, 53 Ill.
239
Gilmore v. Gilmore, 109 Ill.
277 (1884); Rhoads Exr. v. Rhoads et al., 43 Ill.
(1867).
7 Skagg v. Industrial Commission, 371 II. 535, 21 N. E. (2d) 731 (1939).
8 299 111. App. 594, 20 N. E. (2d) 620 (1939). Note, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw
383 (1939).
9 Supra, note 1, 30 N. E. (2d) at p. 94.
10 Supra, note 8, 20 N. E. (2d) at p. 621.
11 Zielinski v. Pleason, supra, note 8.
12 Supra, note 1.
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which is not equally applicable to a judgment where a guardian ad
litem has been appointed but has wholly failed to represent the minor
in the suit, and has permitted judgment to be entered against him without presenting any defense or taking any action to protect the minor's
interest."13
A further basis for distinction seems to appear from the fact that
the action in the Zielinski case was one at law, while the instant case
was one involving equitable cognizance. 14 On this basis, the court should
have decided the instant case the way it did without regard to the action
taken in the Zielinski case, since adequate precedent in equity exists
for such holding. But, is there any distinction to be drawn between cases
arising in law and those arising in equity concerning the necessity of (1)
appointing a guardian ad litem; and (2) requiring such person appointed
to contest the complaint? It is well settled that Illinois courts should
appoint guardians ad litem in legal and equitable causes without distinguishing between the two. A check of the decided cases reveals no
case, except Zielinski v. Pleason, that has drawn such distinction. In
fact, in Skaggs v. Industrial Commission, the court said: "Any action
at law or in equity against the minor without such representation [referring to the appointment of a guardian ad litem] is voidable."' 15 Certainly a minor in a suit at law is as much in need of the court's protection
as is one sued in equity, hence the instant decision goes far toward
repudiating the doctrine expressed by the Zielinski case.
The other principal support for Zielinski v. Pleason rested in the
finding that no injustice had been done to the minor or his interest. If
no possible injustice could be done, the view thereby expressed would
seem to be a logical one and the guardian ad litem made an unnecessary
relic of ancient days who could well be dispensed with. But, no other
Illinois case adopts such view, nor does there appear to be any case
outside of Illinois so holding. 16 Indeed, to the contrary appears the view
that even if an infant is actually represented at a trial by his parents,
and adult defendants whose interests are the same as those of the infant
are making proper defense by their council, 17 this will not cure the
failure to have a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the infant.
The more widely entertained opinion is that failure to appoint a guardian
ad litem for an infant properly before the court is grounds for a new
trial, or for the reversal of the judgment, without regard to actual preju13 301 Ill. 534, 134 N. E. 62, 64 (1922).
14 In the Zielinski case, note 8, supra, at p. 621, the majority opinion states:

"A large number of cases are cited in support of this contention [that the judgment should be reversed]. For the most part they are not in point as they involve
questions of defaults, heirship and suits in equity where the property rights of the
minor were in issue."
15 Supra, note 7, 21 N. E. (2d) at p. 734 citing with approval: White v. Kilmartin,
205 fli. 525, 68 N. E. 1086 (1918); Hall v. Davis, 44 Ill. 494 (1867).
16 Cases apparently holding in accord with Zielinski v. Pleason may be distinguished by reason of local statutes. Note, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 383 at

p. 384 (1939).
17 Johnson v. Waterhouse, 152. Mass. 585, 26 N. E. 234, 11 L. R. A. 440 (1891).
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dice to the infant, the courts generally presuming such prejudice or
injustice has occurred.
The instant case stops short any attempt to introduce novelty into
the law of procedure regarding representation of minors, and agrees
with the view expressed in Sconce v. Whitney by the words, "Were such
a practice once sanctioned, there would be an end of all security to
I. R. LIcHrENsTmEN
infants."' 8
INFANTS-FALSE REPRESENTATIONS-RIGHT OF ADULT, IN INFANT'S SUIT
FOR REscIssIoN OF CONTRACT TO RECOUP FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY INFANT'S
MISREPRESENTATION OF AGE.-In Berryman v. Highway Trailer Company,'
an infant sued to recover the amount paid upon a conditional sales contract for the purchase of a trailer. The vendor filed an answer containing a counterclaim 2 for damages arising by reason of the infant's fraudulent misrepresentation concerning his age. At the ensuing trial, the defendant was allowed damages on the counterclaim in an amount equal
to the payments made by the minor upon the contract thus sought to be
rescinded. On appeal therefrom the judgment was affirmed and earlier
cases were distinguished.3
That an infant has the right, if he wishes to repudiate a contract
4
made during minority is beyond dispute, and, generally such right is
not to be denied even though the minor, by his fraudulent misrepresentations as to his age, has induced the adult to enter into the contract,
since estoppel cannot be invoked.5 It is also equally well understood
that a minor may be held responsible, when sued by an adult, for the
torts committed by the minor, not only when the same arise from deliber7
ate6 or careless conduct, but also when predicated upon the minor's
fraud.' There is, of course, an exception to the last statement, that
when the minor's tort arises from the voidable contract, by reason of
18 12 111. 150, 151 (1850).
App. 480, 30 N. E. (2d) 761 (1940).
1 307 Ill.
2 The defendant filed a plea of recoupment which would indicate that the
defendant merely desired to cancel the plaintiff's claim, even though the defendant's actual damage appears to have been greater than the sum sought to be
recovered by the plaintiff.
8 Hunter v. Egolf Motor Co., 268 111.App. 1 (1932), where the adult vendor was
not allowed to recoup or have a cause of action against the infant, but the opinion
of the court stated that it was clearly established that the automobile sold was
not obtained by fraud; and Burnet v. Chapman, 274 Ill. App. 186 (1934), where
the result was the same as in the Hunter case, but where it was shown that the
defendant did not rely on the minor's representations as to his age, and that
there was no evidence that the defendant had suffered any damage by the disaffirmance of the contract.
398, 89
4 31 C. J. 1093, Infants, § 208; Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Co., 241 Ill.
53, 95 Am. Dec. 572 (1868); Ashlock
N. E. 796 (1909); McCarty v. Carter, 49 Ill.
App. 388 (1888).
v. Vivell, 29 Ill.
16, 51 Am. Rep. 676 (1884).
5 Wieland v. Kobick, 110 Ill.
6 Scott v. Watson, 46 Me. 362, 74 Am. Dec. 457 (1859); Briese v. Maechtle,
146 Wis. 89, 130 N. W. 893 (1911).
7 McCabe v. O'Connor, 38 N. Y. S. 572 (1896).
145 (1865).
8 Davidson v. Young, 38 Ill.
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the breach of some duty thereby imposed upon him, the repudiation of
the contract removes the duty essential to establish the plaintiff's case,
and thus relieves the minor from the consequence of his otherwise tortious conduct. 9
The effective use of the tort claim possessed by the adult when
sued by the minor to recover the consideration paid upon the voidable
contract, however, presents some nice distinctions. Prior to the present
practice, set-off, with its possibility for an affirmative judgment in favor
of the defendant,' 0 was available only in contract actions when the setoff was predicated upon a separate and distinct claim also sounding in
contract." Recoupment, on the other hand, was used to minimize the
plaintiff's recovery, and was available whenever the basis of the defendant's claim arose out of the same transaction. 12 The modern counterclaim is available wherever either of the former might have been used,
and in addition covers any claim by the defendant against the plaintiff
whether in contract or tort, whether legal or equitable, and whether aris13
ing from the same or some other transaction.
Despite the broad scope of the modern counterclaim, however, there
has arisen a tendency to limit its use by the adult vendor, when sued by
the minor to recover consideration paid, to operate by way of recoupment only, rather than to permit an affirmative judgment against the
minor, 14 although the vendor would be free in a separate suit to recover judgment for the actual amount of the damages sustained. 15 That
the infant's right of rescission should operate as a shield and not as a
sword is not to be disputed, and earlier Illinois cases have so regarded
it.16 The instant decision, permitting the use of the counterclaim predicated on the minor's fraud, while not denying the infant his well understood right, does prevent that right from operating as a sword.
It is not clear from the decision, however, whether on these facts
the adult would be permitted in Illinois to secure an affirmative judgment. While the court has made a forward step in the instant case by
9 Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441 (1838). But if the infant intends not to perform at
the time he makes the contract, he can be held in tort. Ashlock v. Vivell, 29 Ill.
App. 388 (1888); Mathews v. Cowan, 59 Ill. 341 at 345-6 (1871).
10 Such affirmative judgment might well interest the adult whose damage, because of the fraud, might far exceed the amount of consideration received from
the minor, as in the instant case.
11 Use thereof would have been unavailing since the minor could repudiate the
contract made the basis of the set off. Kingman v. Draper, 14 Ill. App. 577 (1884).
12 Burns v. Clark, 200 II. App. 277 (1916).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 162.
14 Myers v. Hurley Motor Co. Inc., 273 U. S. 18, 47 S. Ct. 277, 71 L. Ed. 515,
50 A. L. R. 1181 (1927). It will be noted that in the principal case the defendant
appears to have sought recoupment only.
15 The Federal District Court rule, regarding compulsory counterclaims, would
seem to prevent this separate relief in the Federal District Courts. Most state
courts regard the counterclaim as a permissive weapon rather than a compulsory
one. See Gradsky v. Sipe, 30 F. Supp. 656 (1940), for distinction between the use
of the counterclaim in the Federal and the state courts.
'6 Davidson v. Young, 38 Ill. 145 (1865). See also Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578,
55 N. E. 275 (1899).
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permitting the adult to counterclaim, there still remains for decision,
in a proper case, the question whether affirmative relief might be had
against a minor seeking rescission just as it has been granted against
him when he sues on some other claim.' 7 No reason for any distinction
W. G. NEGLEY
between the two problems appears to exist.
INSURANCE--PAYMENT

OF PREMIUMS

OR DUEs-WETnER

AGENT'S

ACT

OF CREDITING PREMIUM AGAINST SERVICES CONSTITUTES PAYMENT OF PREMI-

uM.-Elowe v. Superior Fire Insurance Company presented, in the
words of the Appellate Court, "The novel question in this state whether
an insurance company is bound by a policy of insurance issued by a
broker or agent who trades the policy in exchange for personal services
to be rendered for his personal benefit by the insured, the insurance
company having no knowledge of the arrangement."' This question the
Court answered in the negative.
The agent in this case agreed with the insured to procure a fire
policy on the latter's household furniture in exchange for personal services, whereby the insured would be relieved of payment of the premium. The agent forwarded a policy of the defendant insurance company and a receipt for the premium to the insured. The insured became unable to perform the personal services, whereupon the agent
requested the insurer to cancel the policy. The insurer, not being in
possession of the facts, refused. About eight months later, insured suffered a loss by fire of his household furnishings and brought suit to
recover under his policy with the insurer.
The Court, by analogy to cases wherein the insured, in lieu of paying a premium in cash, traded property to the agent or canceled or
assumed to pay a personal indebtedness of the agent, found substantial
authority for holding the insurer not liable under the policy. No Illinois
cases are precisely in point. 2 In other cases cited in the instant opinion,
the insurer was held not liable because: (a) the agent had no authority
to accept other than cash; 3 (b) the insurer is defrauded by such action
App. 594, 20 N. E. (2d) 620 (1939), the minor
17 In Zielinski v. Pleason, 299 Ill.
sued in tort, and was met by a counterclaim in tort which ultimately produced
affirmative relief for the adult defendant in the lower court; reversed in the
Illinois Supreme Court on other grounds.
1 307 Ill.
App. 569, 30 N. E. (2d) 953, 955 (1941).
2 The Court cited Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Ward, 90 Ill. 545 (1878), and John Han-

cock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schlink, 175 II. 284, 51 N. E. 795 (1898). In each case
the agent received sufficient cash from the insured to cover the insurer's share of

the premium, and it was held that the agent could properly waive payment in
cash of that part of the premium representing his commission without invalidating
the policy. "The implication arising from these two decisions," according to the
instant opinion, "is that the court would not have sanctioned payment of the
entire premium through the exchange of merchandise or personal services."
s Hoffman v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 161, 23 L. Ed. 539
(1876); Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Cole, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 486, 35 S. W.
720 (1896); Turner v. Supreme Lodge K.P., 166 Okla. 286, 27 P. (2d) 612, 93 A. L. R.
647 (1933). See also: Kahn v. Philadelphia Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,o108 S. W. (2d)
457 (Mo. App., 1937).
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of the agent; 4 (c) to hold an insurer bound by the agent's acceptance
of a horse5 or a suit of clothes in payment of a premium might result
in the insurer's embarking upon an undertaking alien to its charter,
namely, maintaining stables or engaging in mercantile business; (d)
public interest is involved because the insurer, without cash premiums,
cannot pay losses in cash.7 In these decisions, no distinction is made
between agents and brokers.8
In the instant case, the Court pronounced the agreement invalid
for reasons "inherent in the basis on which the insurance business is
conducted" and in the law of agency which gives the broker no such
authority by implication. Illinois is therefore consistent with the majority views.
The plaintiff's contention that the insurer was estopped because the
policy remained in force for eight months was held untenable because
the insurer had no knowledge of the agent's arrangement and did disaffirm as soon as it came into possession of the facts.
LANDLORD AND
HOLDING OVER AS

TENANT-LANDLORD'S RIGHT OF ELECTION TO CONSIDER
A RENEwA--WHETHER TENANT'S INTENT GOVERNS IN

HOLDN G OVER.-The recent Illinois Appellate case of Commonwealth
Building Corporation v. Hirschfield' extends the rule as to what will be
4 Hoffman v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, n. 3; Folb v. Fireman's
Ins. Co. of Baltimore, 133 N. C. 179, 45 S. E. 547 (1903); Cohen v. New Zealand
Ins. Co., Ltd. 100 N. J. L. 110, 126 A. 417 (1924); Smith v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
120 Kan. 53, 242 P. 455 (1926); Ostrander, Fire Insurance (2d Ed.), 295, § 94, cited
in Turner v. Supreme Lodge K.P., supra, n. 3, and Folb v. Fireman's Ins. Co. of
Baltimore, id. where it is stated: "The distinction between the agent and his
principal should be kept in view. The premium on a policy of insurance is the
property of the latter, and not of the former. Where the agent delivers a policy
to the merchant with whom he has dealings, and to whom he is indebted for goods
due for the use of his family, and the premium by agreement, is placed to the
credit of his account, it is a fraud on the principal; and, should a loss occur, the
agent having failed to remit, the insurer will not be liable. The agent cannot

appropriate to his own use the funds of his principal, without a wrong being done
the latter; and when merchandise is accepted in payment, or the premium is
applied to pay a debt due to the insured, the latter becomes a party to the wrong,
and the company will not be bound." See also Kahn v. Philadelphia Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., supra, n. 3.
5 Hoffman v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, n. 3.
6 Cohen v. New Zealand Ins. Co., Ltd., supra, n. 4.
7 Clingerman v. Pheasant, 18 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 203, cited in Smith v. Hartford Fire
Ins.' Co., supra, n. 4: The Court said: "To sanction payment of a premium, in a
case where the agent had not already advanced the same to the company, by
assuming to pay an individual debt of an agent, would be to introduce a principle
subversive of good morals and common honesty and intending to sap the ability
of companies to pay their legitimate losses." See Hoffman v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Ins. Co. supra, n. 3, to same effect. At least one state, Alabama, has
by statute rendered illegal an agreement by the insured to transfer property to
the agent in payment of a premium. See Pryor v. Gowan, 204 Ala. 257, 85 So.
370 (1920), citing § 2 of act published in Gen. Acts, Special Session, 1909, pp. 111-5.
8 Only one case, however, involved a solicitor, i.e., Hoffman v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, n. 3.
1 307 Ill. App. 533, 30 N. E. (2d) 790 (1940).
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excused in a tenant's "holding over" after the expiration of his lease.
Suit was brought in the Municipal Court of Chicago by the Building
Corporation for a year's rent of $3300 after the tenant had held over
for ten hours following the expiration of his lease at midnight of September 30th. About two months before the lease was to expire, the defendant had notified the corporation, by registered mail, of his intention
to leave at the end of the term. During the final few days of occupancy
he had moved out the bulk of his goods and furniture, but he and his
family, with the servants, spent the final night in the leased premises;
carpets and bedroom furniture had not been moved out although they
were promptly removed the following day, October 1. At about 10 o'clock
in the morning of October 1, an agent of the plaintiff served the defendant formally with notice that it intended to hold him for another
year, asking also payment of the October rent.
The jury awarded the plaintiff $1100 of the $3300 sued for. The
Appellate Court reversed, stating clearly that a tenant to be liable as
a hold-over must remain voluntarily. The early Illinois cases under
similar facts seem to disregard the tenant's intent entirely, 2 although
the case of The United Cigar Stores Company v. Worth-Gyles Grain
Company3 liberalized the strict doctrine by recognizing that the tenant
should be given special consideration when moving would have had to
be on a holiday.
A leading authority in discussing the question of intent states the
rule in this language: ". . . the presumption that a tenant who holds
over is holding over upon the terms of the original lease is not rebutted
by proof of a different intention on the part of the tenant alone which
4
is not communicated to or assented in by the landlord" and cites certain Illinois cases as authority.
Another standard work,5 in its treatment of holding over, regards
the usual practice as being against considering the tenant's intent. The
following section of the same work states " . . . it is more satisfactory
to regard this as 'one among the cases where a person may be charged,
as upon a contract, without his consent, and contrary to his intention.' "6 As authority it cites one of the cases relied on by the court
in its decision here.
However, the Illinois Court has authority for its decision. The court
states that it adopted the New York rule in The Clinton Wire Cloth
2 City of Chicago v. Peck, 98 Ill. App. 434 (1901); Quinlan v. Bonte, 25 Ill. App.
240 (1888); Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 Ill. 151 (1881); Keegan v. Kinnare, Adm'x, 123 Ill. 280, 14 N. E. 14 (1887); Eppstein v. Kuhn, 225 Ill. 115, 80 N. E.
80 (1907); Meyers v. Johnson, 186 Ill. App. 37 (1914).
3 212 Ill. App. 26 (1918).
4 Underhill, Landlord and Tenant, I, 144, § 99.

5 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.), I, 281, § 175 states "By the decided weight
of authority in this country, a tenant for years who holds over after the end of
his term may be held liable as a tenant for a further period, without reference
to his wishes on the subject."
6 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.), I, 283, § 176.
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Company v. Gardner,7 and that this rule has been followed in subsequent cases on the theory that the holding over was voluntary. 8 New
York cases, although not on the precise ground of this case, have held
liberally in certain instances where the holding over was occasioned
by some outside circumstance. This is apparent from cases excusing
the tenant where quarantined by the Board of Health or where illness
of a member of his family prevented moving. 9 In the instant case, however, for all that appears, the holding over, although slight and probably
of little or no damage to the landlord, was occasioned by the tenant's
neglect to make arrangements. It is clear, both from the tenant's actions and from his having notified the landlord that his intent was to
vacate, but heretofore the tenant's intent was regarded as having no
legal effect on the status of the parties if the landlord chose to treat
him as a hold-over; the landlord's intent was the key to a solution of
the problem.
The doctrine adopted by our Appellate Court still leaves the tenant
liable for intentional and voluntary holding over. Here, the holding over
had continued only ten hours when the notice was given in which the
landlord attempted to hold the tenant for another term. However, the
delay was occasioned by lack of action on the part of the tenant. He
simply failed to make arrangements to move in such a way or on such
terms as would have enabled his vacating at the time necessary. So
far as is indicated no outside party or force not subject to control by
him prevented his vacating in comformity with the terms of his lease.
Presiding Justice O'Connor reveals the thought of the court in his
specially concurring opinion, which states: ". . . the claim made by
plaintiff for $3300 shocks the conscience of the court. It is wholly without merit and ought not to be entertained by any court of justice."' 0 In
another place it is stated: ". . . it is common knowledge in Chicago, of
which we take judicial notice, that some leases of apartments expire
on the 30th of April and others on the 30th of September, and that a
lease to a succeeding tenant begins the first of May and others on the
first of October. And everyone knows that tenants who are vacating on
the 30th of April or on the 30th of September, as the case might be,
have not completed their moving on the last day covered by their respective leases, there being a great many persons moving at those
times so that it is physically impossible to do so. But in such cases
the 'rule of reason' must constantly be kept in mind.''''
It may be that the court felt that this slight hold-over was caused
by lack of moving facilities and that the tenant, even though according
to strict rules he would be liable, should be given special consideration
for his bona fide attempt in the "rush" moving period. Perhaps the
doctrine is intended to apply only to the moving periods when, as the
7 99 Ill.151

(1881).
8 The United Cigar Stores Co. v. Worth-Gyles Grain Co., 212 Ill. App. 26 (1918).

9 Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N.Y. 287, 31 N. E. 94 (1892); Herter v. Mullen, 41
N. Y. S. 708 (1896).
11 Ibid.
10 307 Ill. App. 533, 30 N. E. (2d) 790, 793 (1940).
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court recognizes, it is often impossible to get ready response and service
from trucking and moving companies.
There is still a question as to what period of time will be excused.
Will the "rule of reason" extend to a day, two days, or several days
if trucking companies are rushed at moving periods and the tenant's
intent is clear? It would seem that the "rule of reason" consideration
given the tenant here, can extend to but a very slight hold-over; otherwise landlords and tenants could never be sure when their newly leased
E. P. YOUNG
apartments would actually be free for occupancy.
SALES-CoNDITIONAL SALES-EFFECT OF CLAUSE WAIVING DEFENSES AS TO
Laundry purchased, under a
conditional sales contract, a stoker and other equipment from a local
dealer, which contract contained a provision that it might be assigned
to a named bank, and when assigned should be free from any defense
or counterclaim by the purchaser. The contract was assigned and after
a few monthly payments, the purchaser failed to make further payments on the ground that there had been a breach of the implied warranty of fitness of the stoker. At the enusing trial the purchaser alleged
the breach of warranty as a defense, which was not allowed; the Circuit Court of Appeals holding, "Unless in circumstances affronting public policy, it is no part of the business of the courts to decline to give
effect to contracts which the parties have fairly and deliberately
made."'
The problem as to the legal effect of such clauses is comparatively
new, since this type of contract would seem to have been only recently
utilized as a financing device. There are few cases passing squarely
on this point but the majority seem to give effect to such clauses where
they do not conflict with the public policy of the state.2 These questions
then arise: When is such a clause against public policy? Can parties,
by contract, import elements of negotiability to otherwise non-negotiable
paper?
The entire law merchant and all of the concepts of negotiability
arose as a practical solution and expedient to the commercial needs
of the times. 3 From a perusal of the history of negotiable instruments,
it is evident that new instruments were created as a product of the
commercial demands of the day. 4 The history and analysis of comASSIGNEE OF VENDEE.-The Troy-Parisian

1 United States ex rel. and for the Benefit of Administrator of Federal Housing
Administration v. Troy-Parisian, Inc., 115 F. (2d) 224, 226 (1940).
2 American Nat. Bank of San Francisco v. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216
P. 376 (1923); Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. Whalen, 43 Ida. 15, 246 P. 444 (1926);
Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 P. 991 (1922).
3 Ralph W. Aigler, "Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments," 24
Col. L. Rev. 563 (1924); Ralph W. Aigler, "Commercial Instruments, The Law
Merchant, and Negotiability," 8 Minn. L. Rev. 361 (1924). Note, 8 Wis. L. Rev.
272 (1933). Note, 25 Col. L. Rev. 209 (1925).
4 Frederick K. Beutel, "Negotiability by Contract," 28 Ill. L. Rev. 205 (1933).
See note 3, supra.
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mercial paper sanction the extension of the doctrine of negotiability to
newer types of instruments where business conditions are such as to
demand it. 5 It might be difficult to understand why this is true of
an ordinary conditional sales contract when a simple negotiable note
might be attached to it. However, the mere fact that such contracts
are used denotes that particular kinds of businesses find this a convenient financing device. The cases would seem to indicate that limited
elements of negotiability may be imported to a conditional sales contract by mutual assent of the parties. 6
Assuming that the parties may give a conditional sales contract
limited elements of negotiability by a "waiver of defense clause," it
is to be remembered that it is still only a contract and as such may
be against the public policy of the state.
A California court, wherein such a waiver clause was involved, held
that it was error not to allow proof of a failure of consideration by the
purchaser against the assignee. 7 The Idaho Court, in a case prior to
the principal case,8 tacitly approved this decision by holding that a
waiver clause did not preclude the defense of fraud or total want of
consideration. In another California case, 9 the purchaser was held not
estopped to set up usury against the assignee. An Arizona court 0 held
such a clause against their public policy as being in contravention of
a statute which provided that an assignment shall be without prejudice
against counterclaims.
There are, however, several cases which have upheld similar waiver
clauses as valid, and have estopped purchasers from interposing defenses of breach of warranty 1 and failure of consideration. 12 Although
in seeming conflict, these cases can be reconciled on the theory that
the waiving of particular defenses is against public policy. It seems
that where the defenses sought to be waived are lack of consideration
or breach of warranty, the states have held that there is no objection
on the ground of public policy. 1" Where fraud or duress are the particular defenses sought to be waived in a simple contract, it is fairly
clear that this would be against public policy based on the general
concept in the law that one can't profit from his own wrong. This has
Note, 24 Col. L. Rev. 757 (1924).
6 American Nat. Bank of San Francisco v. Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376
(1923); Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. Whalen, 43 Ida. 15, 246 P. 444 (1926); San
Joaquin Finance Corp. v. Allen, 102 Cal. App. 400, 283 P. 117 (1929); Elzey v.
Ajax Heating Co., 10 N. J. Misc. 281, 158 A. 851 (1932).
7 American Nat. Bank of San Francisco v. Sommerville, supra, n. 6.
8 Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. Whalen, supra, n. 6.
9 San Joaquin Finance Corp. v. Allen, supra, n. 6.
10 San Francisco Securities Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., Inc., 25 Ariz. 531, 220
P. 229 (1923).
11 American Nat. Bank of San Francisco v. Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376
(1923); Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 P. 991 (1922); Pacific
Acceptance Corp. v. Whalen, 43 Ida. 15, 246 P. 444 (1926).
12 Elzey v. Ajax Heating Co., 10 N. J. Misc. 281, 158 A. 851 (1932).
13 See note 6, supra.
5
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been, by analogy, carried over even where the waiver is only as to
the assignee. The courts recognize that although the purchaser may
have an action against the vendor, this is a rather hollow remedy
against one disposed to commit a fraud. Where, however, the defense
involves no moral turpitude, the question as to whether it is against
public policy will depend on the attitude of the particular state.
This distinction upon a basis of public policy is particularly interesting in view of the inclusion of all of these defenses within the category
14
of "defects of title" under the uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.
The only basis of reconciliation would seem to lie in the assumption
either that the common law has lost its vitality to create new types
of negotiable instruments, or that such power still exists but is not invoked by sufficient economic necessity with respect to the transactions
15
under consideration.
An Illinois statute 16 which requires all notes secured by chattel
mortgages to state this fact upon their face and further provides that
when such note is indorsed or assigned shall be subject to all defenses
existing between payee and payor, furnishes some basis for presuming
that Illinois' position would seem to be defined.
The statute was obviously prompted by a desire to protect one in
an unfavorable economic position and is an indication of the legislatures' attitude to a situation involving a "necessitous borrower." The
same situation would seem to exist with regard to a vendee under a
conditional sales contract, 17 and although the statute does not apply
by its terms, it would seem that sufficient similarity exists, so that
the policy inherent in the statute might be held applicable and render
S. A. WEINSTEIN
invalid such a waiver clause.
TAXATION-STATUTORY REDEMPTION FROM TAX FORECLOSURE SALE-WHETHER,

UPON

OWNER'S

REDEMPTION,

LIEN

Is

REVIVED

FOR

PORTION

OF

REAL

ESTATE TAXES NOT REALIZED AT FORECLOSURE SALE.-A further examination
of the case of French v. Toman' dispels the hope, generally entertained by members of the bar upon first reading about the case in the
press, that the decision might obviate the necessity for the customary
independent injunction suit to clear title following redemption from an
equity tax foreclosure.
A foreclosure decree had been entered upon a finding of $7,466.47
delinquent taxes due for the years 1927 to 1937, inclusive, upon real
estate in Cook County, Illinois, and the premises were sold by the
Collector for $2,200.2 The plaintiff, who had acquired title to the
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 98, §§ 75 and 77.
15 See notes 3, 4, and 5, supra.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95, § 26.
17 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.), III, 2803, § 734.
1 375 Ill. 389, 31 N.E. (2d) 801 (1941).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 697. The foreclosure sale, here permitted, to
enforce a tax lien on realty is not required to be for the full amount of the lien,
but the price at which the property sells is governed by ordinary rules of foreclosure.
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property involved subsequent to April 1, 1937,3 redeemed from the
foreclosure sale within the period permitted by the statute. 4 She then
filed a complaint asking the Superior Court of Cook County to enjoin
the collection of any part of the taxes for the delinquent years, and the
extension of any part of such taxes. The Collector, in defending the
action, contended that the amount of taxes not realized at the foreclosure
5
sale remained a lien upon the premises until the same was paid in full;
that the lien is revived by the owner's redemption, to the extent of the
6
portion unpaid.
The plaintiff was successful in her suit and, upon appeal by the
defendant, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Superior
Court of Cook County granting a permanent injunction, as prayed. It
held, in effect, that the lien for that part of the delinquent taxes not
realized at the foreclosure sale, was not revived by the redemption
from such sale by the plaintiff, who, although she held title to the property
at the time of the foreclosure decree, was not primarily liable for the
7
taxes.
This holding represents a logical extension of the pattern fabricated
by prior decisions of the Illinois court. Within the framework of the
Illinois law, there are available several remedies for the nonpayment of
indebtedness secured by mortgages, and other evidences of obligation,
8
which constitute liens upon real property.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 511. April first is the real property tax assessment date.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 734; Ill. Const. of 1870, Art. IX, § 5. Actually
the plaintiff in the principal case redeemed the property from the foreclosure
sale within four months after the foreclosure decree was entered.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 697. "The taxes upon real property, together
with all penalties, interests and costs, that may accrue thereon, shall be a prior
and first lien on such real property, superior to all other liens and incumbrances,
from and including the first day of April in the year in which the taxes are levied
until the same are paid. . .

."

(Italics supplied.) The court, in the principal case,

held in effect that the words "until the same are paid" not only denoted the
actual payment of the taxes, but also connoted such amount as may be paid at a
foreclosure sale in satisfaction of the lien. This conclusion is based upon two
premises: first, that the foreclosure sale is not required to be for the full amount
of the tax lien (see note 2, supra); and second, that the foreclosure of a lien
extinguishes it and discharges the premises therefrom (see notes 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
and 15, infra).
6 But see: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 697, specifically permitting foreclosure
of tax liens upon real property, (also note 21, infra); Ill. Const. of 1870, Art. IX,
§ 5, specifically permitting the owner of real property to redeem from sale thereof
for nonpayment of taxes; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 18, providing for redemption of real estate from foreclosure sale by payment of "the sum of money for
which the premises were sold or bid off, with interest . . . whereupon such sale
and certificate shall be null and void."; and note 25, infra.
7 "The owner of property on the first day of April in any year shall be liable for
the taxes of that year. The purchaser of property on the first day of April shall
be considered as the owner on that day." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 509. Plaintiff here acquired title to the property in question subsequent to April 1, 1937, the
date upon which the latest taxes here involved were assessed.
s Harold L. Reeve, Illinois Law of Mortgages and Foreclosures (Chicago:
Callaghan and Company, 1932) I, 495 et seq., Ch. 23. Concurrent or successive
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Perhaps the most common method of enforcing the lien of a real
estate mortgage is by the institution of foreclosure proceedings in the
manner provided in the statute. 9 When this procedure is consummated,
the lien of that particular mortgage has been held to be extinguished,10
exhausted," or merged in and transferred to the foreclosure decree. 12
This result follows regardless of whether the entire amount secured
by the mortgage, or a lesser sum only, is realized at the sale held
pursuant to such decree. 13 The purchaser at such sale takes the
premises discharged from the lien, 14 probably, even with respect to
portions of the debt at that time unmatured. 1
Concurrent with the right to foreclosure is the absolute right to
redeem from the foreclosure sale and thus render the sale void. 16 There
are two methods of proceeding: one is the so-called "equitable redemption," in which, the redemptioner is obligated to pay the whole amount
actually due; the other, for convenience, is designated "statutory redemption." Only those parties, in the particular manner specified by statute,
may exercise the right of statutory redemption. 17 When such redemption is effected by a party who is primarily liable for the debt secured
by the foreclosed mortgage, it has been generally held that resort may
remedies: suit in assumpsit for judgment or decree, "partial" foreclosure, foreclosure by scire facias. "strict" foreclosure, confession of judgment where the
note so provides, etc.
9 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95, §§ 17-23; and Ch. 110.
10 Seligman v. Laubheimer, 58 Ill. 124 (1871); Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510,
58 N.E. 221 (1900); Strause v. Dutch, 250 Ill. 326, 95 N.E. 286 (1911); McCullough
v. Rose, 4 Ill.
App. 149 (1879).
11 ". . . when the lien has once been enforced by the sale of the property, it
has, as to such property, expended its force and accomplished its purposse and the
property is no longer subject to it." Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Ill. 170, 179, 29 N.E. 563
(1892). Easter v. Holcomb, 221 Ill.
App. 485 (1921); Rowson v. Bethesda Baptist
Church, 221 Ill.
216, 77 N.E. 560, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 448 (1906); Lightcap v. Bradley,
186 Ill.510, 58 N.E. 221 (1900); U.S. Mortgage Co. v. Gross, 93 Ill.483 (1879);
Davis v. Dale, 150 Ill. 239, 37 N.E. 215 (1894); Wayman v. Cochrane, 35 Ill. 151
(1864).
12 Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill.
510, 58 N.E. 221 (1900); Seligman v. Laubheimer,
58 Ill.124 (1871).
13 Seligman v. Laubheimer. 58 II. 124 (1871); Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Ill.170, 29
N.E. 563 (1892).
14 Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 II. 510, 58 N.E. 221 (1900); Rains v. Mann, 68 Ill. 264
(1873); Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Ill.
170, 29 N.E. 563 (1892) and cases cited.
15 "The sale of premises under a decree of foreclosure, where the decree does
not expressly save any right to resort to the land again, is an absolute discharge
of the premises from the lien. In the absence of a provision for another sale the
premises will be discharged, even from unmatured portions of the debt. (Rains
v. Mann, 68 Ill.
264)." Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510, 58 N.E. 221 (1900).
16 Il. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 18; Ill.
Const. of 1870, Art. IX, § 5; Butler v.
Brown, 205 Ill. 606, 69 N.E. 44 (1903); Easter v. Holcomb, 221 Ill. App. 485 (1921) ;'
Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Ill.
170, 29 N.E. 563 (1892). "Wherever there is a mortgage,
there is a right in the mortgagor or grantor to redeem the thing mortgaged."; ...
"The right to redeem and right to foreclose are reciprocal . . ." Harold L. Reeve,
Illinois Law of Mortgages and Foreclosures (Chicago: Callaghan and Company,
1932), II, 822, 824, § 728.
17

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, §§ 18 et seq.
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be had to the same property for the purpose of subjecting it to the payment of any unpaid balance which may be due on the mortgage. 18 By
the same token, the weight of authority has been that when such redemption is effected by one who was not primarily liable for the mortgage
debt, the lien having been exhausted, the property will not be subjected
for the second time to the same lien or to the payment of the same debt. 19
Real estate taxes are expressly declared to be a prior lien upon the
real property against which they are assessed, and to remain a first
lien thereon until the same are paid. 20 As might be anticipated, the
statutory foreclosure method of enforcing the lien of such taxes is available to the same extent, and with the same effect, as it is with respect to
other liens. 21 The statute contemplates a proceeding in rem 22 and
is true, that if the premises are redeemed by the mortgagor they be18 "It
come like any other property owned by him and may be subject to execution and
sale for a deficiency; but that is because they belong to the debtor, and not on
account of any lien by virtue of the mortgage. A redemption by any person not
liable for the debt would free them absolutely, so that they could not even be
levied upon by execution for a deficiency." Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510, 527,
58 N.E. 221 (1900). "When the redemption is made by a party primarily liable on
mortgage debt, it may be that the same property may be resorted to again for the
purpose of subjecting it to the payment of an unpaid balance due on the mortgage, but that is not because of any right to enforce the mortgage lien against the
same property a second time, but because of the rule of law which subjects all
property of a debtor to the payment of his debts until they are satisfied in full.
But where the redemption is made by a party not liable upon the mortgage debt,
mortgage lien having been exhausted, the property can not be subjected a second
time to the satisfaction of the same lien." Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Ill. 170, 179, 29 N.E.
563 (1892). Only such redemptioners as were primarily liable for the indebtedness,
become liable for any balance which may be due on a foreclosure, and then only
in the event that a deficiency decree is found against such person primarily
liable. Rubin v. Chicago Title and Trust Company, 249 Ill. App. 486 (1928).
19 Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510, 58 N.E. 221 (1900). See note 18, supra, for
quotation from 186 Ill. 510, at pages 526 and 527; Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Ill. 170, 29
N.E. 563 (1892). See also note 18, supra, for quotation from 140 Ill. 170, at pages
179 and 180; Easter v. Holcomb, 221 Ill. App. 485 (1921); Strause v. Dutch, 250 11L
326, 95 N.E. 286 (1911); Seligman v. Laubheimer, 58 Ill. 124 (1871).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 697.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 734. "Section 253, as originally passed in 1872,
merely provided that taxes assessed upon real property should be a lien thereon
from and including the first day of May in the year in which they are levied,
until the same are paid. (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 899.) Under this statute providing for
a lien on real estate for taxes a bill in equity was filed . . . to foreclose a lien for
. . . taxes on lands that had been forfeited to the State. A demurrer was sustained to the bill and the bill dismissed. . . . The decree dismissing the bill was
affirmed. (People v. Biggins, 96 Ill. 481). This court there held that the lien given
by section 253 was purely statutory and could only be enforced in the modes
provided by the statute, and that a court of equity had no jurisdiction to foreclose
the lien. . . . At the next session of the legislature after the decision in the
Biggins case section 253 was amended so as to provide, as said section now does,
for the foreclosure of such tax lien in equity. (Laws of 1881, p. 130.) After the
section was amended another bill was filed against Biggins, and a decree foreclosing the lien was affirmed by this court in Biggins v. People, 106 Ill. 270."
Clark v. Zaleski, 253 Ill. 63, 76, 97 N.E. 272 (1912). "Authority to foreclose the tax
lien in equity was given in 1881 by an amendment of section 253 which contained
no procedural directions, except that the same notice and right of redemption as
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23
the foreclosure sale extinguishes the lien of such delinquent taxes.
Once extinguished, of course, the lien ceases to exist. The lien itself
derives from positive statutory enactment, 24 and, after its demise, will
not again be revived in the absence of statutory provision therefor. Upon
this question the Revenue Act is completely silent, 25 and the implications
of the statute will not be extended beyond the clear import of the lan26
guage employed.
The only possible source from which it might be inferred that the
same land would, upon redemption, again become subject to a lien for
the unpaid balance of such delinquent taxes, would be the element of
personal liability of the landowner for the taxes assessed against his
property. 27 Here, as in the case of mortgages and other liens, resort
would be had to the property, not because of any revival of the original
statutory lien, or any right to enforce the same lien twice against the

were then required by law, and conformity with sections 4 and 5 of Article 9 of
the Constitution, were required. The statute enlarged the jurisdiction of equity
so as to include the foreclosure of tax liens. That jurisdiction is to be exercised,
except as otherwise provided by law, to the same extent and in the same manner
as in the enforcement of other liens in equity, and it was substantially so held in
Clark v. Zaleski, 253 Ill. 63. The usual practice in enforcing liens is to decree a
sale, for cash, to the highest bidder. This was done here, and it was no ground
of objection to the sale that the county treasurer followed the decree." The
People v. Cant, 260 Ill. 497, 499, 103 N.E. 232 (1913). The decree in question
ordered "the county treasurer, in default of payment within three days, to sell
the lots at public auction, for cash, to the highest bidder."
22 Langlois v. People, 212 Ill. 75, 72 N.E. 28 (1904); the procedure contemplated
by Ill. Const. of 1870, Art. IX, §§ 4 and 5, and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 734
(Revenue Act, § 235) for foreclosing lien for taxes, looks toward a judgment in
rein against the land itself; Douthett v. Kettle, 104 Ill. 356 (1882).
23 O'Connell v. Sanford, 256 Ill. 62, 99 N.E. 885 (1912). A sale of land for taxes
extinguishes the lien of the State created by Revenue Act, § 253; "The theory of
the law is, that a sale under such foreclosure is made in full satisfaction of all
previous tax liens and encumbrances, and that the purchaser will not be required to pay or discharge any liens or encumbrances above the amount of his
bid. It would be absurd to say that a purchaser under such sale would take the
land subject to all prior tax liens. If this were true, there would be no advantage
in foreclosing such liens over a purchase for the full amount due at an ordinary
tax sale." Clark v. Zaleski, 253 Ill. 63, 83, 97 N.E. 272 (1912). Biggins v. People,
106 Ill. 270 (1883); Law v. People ex rel., 116 Ill. 244, 4 N.E. 845 (1886).
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 697; Binkert v. Wabash Ry. Co., 98 Ill. 205
(1881).
25 The foreclosure and sale of realty for delinquent taxes extinguishes the tax
lien (see note 23, supra); redemption from such sale renders the sale and certificate void (see note 16, supra), but the statute makes no mention of the revival
of the tax lien as a consequence thereof. Redemption operates to annul sale
and divest the lien of the tax for which the land was sold. 61 C.J. 1287-8, Taxation, § 1788.
26 Peoples Gas Light Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 152, 194 N.E. 260 (1935); Majestic
Household Utilities Corp. v. Stratton, 353 Ill. 86, 186 N.E. 522, 89 A.L.R. 852
(1933); Lawton v. Sweitzer, 354 Ill. 620, 188 N.E. 811 (1934); Elmhurst State Bank
v. Stone, 346 Ill. 157, 178 N.E. 362 (1931). The general holding is that taxing
statutes requiring interpretation will be construed most strongly against the
government and in favor of the landowner or tax-paying citizen.
27 See notes 18 and 19, supra, and 35, infra.
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same parcel of land, but because of the general rule of law subjecting
all of the property of a debtor to the payment of his debts until they
are satisfied in full.

28

Assessed in the light of this discussion, the significance of the holding
in French v. Toman29 is limited by the express restriction of the application of its decision to instances where the redemptioner is not personally liable for the particular taxes in question. 30 The case does, however, represent a consistent extension in the realm of tax liens, of the
rule heretofore applied to the effect of redemption from a mortgage
foreclosure sale by a junior encumbrancer; the latter takes the
property free from the lien of the unrealized portion of the senior mortgage debt. 3 ' The plaintiff here, being the prior titleholder, without personal liability, is treated as a grantee from a former owner, redeeming
independently and for her own benefit, and obtaining title free from
the lien of taxes.
The opinion in this case appears to indicate that there is a possibility of abolishing the requirement of the second injunction proceeding
to perfect title in the redemptioner, at least under some circumstances. 32 The particular situation here exemplified is one in which it
is conceded that the redemptioner is not primarily liable for the tax
indebtedness and the decision is specifically limited to those facts by
an embodiment of such finding in the opinion.33 Nevertheless, it is not
improbable that the holding in this case might be expanded, by decree
28

See note 18, supra.

29

375 Ill. 389, 31 N.E. (2d) 801 (1941).

80 Ibid., 31 N.E. (2d) at p. 805, the court stated: "It is of no consequence that

because the redemption voided the sale, appellee still has the same title as before
the foreclosure. She is not a person primarily liable for the debt. She redeemed
in an independent position from that of the former owner and for her own benefit,
and her title is free from the lien of the taxes." (Italics supplied.)
31 Ibid., at p. 804, the court stated: "The record does not show how appellee
acquired title, but since it shows she is the sole owner, and acquired title after
the taxes became a lien, her position is that of a grantee from the one who owned
the property when the taxes were assessed. A junior encumbrancer, who redeems from a foreclosure sale, takes free from any lien for the unpaid portion
of the debt not realized by the sale. Seligman v. Laubheimer, supra; Ogle v.
Koerner, supra. The rights and obligations of a grantee and a junior encumbrancer who redeem are the same ....
The reason for this is that each redeems
for his own benefit and not because of any relation with the party primarily
liable for the debt. There is no logical ground for distinguishing between them.
It follows, that if redemption by a junior mortgage does not revive the lien of
a prior emcumbrance, a redemption by a grantee of the lien debtor will not do
so." See also, Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Ill. 170, 29 N.E. 563 (1892) where it was held,
in effect, that the holder of a second mortgage lien, who was party to the decree,
may redeem from a sale under a foreclosure decree and, by so doing, will be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser and will take the land free from the
lien of the senior mortgage.
82 It is understood, however, that, as a matter of actual practice, neither the
Chicago Title and Trust Company nor the Registrar of Cook County has waived
the necessity for the customary independent injunction suit to clear title following redemption; on the contrary, both have required such subsequent proceedings
since the decision in the instant case.
33 See note 30, supra.
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in a subsequent proceeding, to embrace a situation in which the redemptioner was the holder of title during the accrual period of taxes
which became delinquent and which formed the basis of a similar foreclosure suit. If it be held that such a redemptioner would be personally
liable for the delinquent taxes, resort could again be had to the property
for satisfaction of the tax indebtedness. 34 This would constitute a potential bar to a further extension of the ruling in this case, and the
independent injunction suit would now unquestionably be required. Conceivably that objection might be cured by an unequivocal judicial holding that no personal liability arises from a real property tax. A more
direct route to that result might be found in a legislative declaration
to the same effect. 35
For the present, from a strictly practical standpoint, the decision
in French v. Toman 6 has not altered the situation with respect to the
question in issue. On the contrary, it is understood that injunction proceedings subsequent to redemption, even by one not primarily liable for
the indebtedness, are still required in Illinois before the redemptioner
can be assured of good title, free from the lien of that portion of the
indebtedness not realized at the foreclosure sale.3 7
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See note 18, supra.
85 See notes 18 and 19, supra. These considerations are tangential to the issue
34

here involved in that they lead to a collateral field which is of great interest.
Space does not permit more than a slight exploration of that field. Standing at
its border in the past were several sections of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
Ch. 120), among which were: § 230 (Laws 1871-2. Repealed by Act approved
May 17, 1939), providing for the collection of taxes on forfeited property, which
was held to furnish a purely personal remedy against the person owning the
property on the date of assessment, and the judgment pursuant to the employment of such remedy, held to be a purely personal judgment upon which execution might be levied on any property of the judgment debtor liable to execution.,
Greenwood v. Towh of LaSalle, 137 Ill. 225, 26 N.E. 1089 (1891); Byrne v. Town
of LaSalle, 123 Ill. 581, 14 N.E. 679 (1888); and § 245 (Laws 1871-2. Repealed by
Act approved May 17, 1939), which provided that the owner of the real estate at
the time general taxes became a lien thereon might be sued in an action of
debt for such taxes, the judgment recovered in such suit being in personam. It
will be observed that these sections of the old Revenue Act have now been repealed. The new Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120) contains a provision
(Ch. 120, § 699), reading in part as follows: "Personal property shall be liable
for taxes levied on real property . . . the tax on real property may be made
out of personal property, at any time after the tax becomes due, by any collector having the tax books in his hands, by distraint and sale...."
Prior to the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1939, in People ex rel. v. The Chicago, M.,
St. P. & P. R. Co., 354 Ill. 438, 188 N.E. 404 (1933), it was stated as sheer dictum,
at page 406: "A delinquent personal property tax differs from a delinquent real
estate tax. There is no personal liability for a delinquent real estate tax, but
there is a direct personal liability for a personal property tax properly levied and
extended." Query: whether that was in fact an accurate reflection of the situation in 1933, and, if so, whether it was altered by the enactment of § 218 of the
Revenue Act of 1939 (hereinabove quoted in part)? If there had been a sufficiently
definite holding on those questions, it would materially assist in determining
whether or not a judicial holding or legislative declaration (that real estate
taxes do not constitute a personal liability) might be anticipated.
36 375 Ill. 389, 31 N.E. (2d) 801 (1941).
37 See note 32, supra.

